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AVIAN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC MAY EXPAND THE MILITARY ROLE IN DISASTER RELIEF
The role of the United States military in disaster relief operations both internationally and domestically is increasing. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in the United States gulf coast region, the President of the United States indicated the U.S. military will have an increased role in domestic disaster relief operations. This responsibility primarily belongs to the Department of Homeland Security at the federal level but recent comments by some national leaders suggest that this could change. Based on unique command and control capabilities and other resources that can be mobilized quickly to respond to a disaster, putting the Department of Defense in charge of domestic disaster relief, at first glance, makes sense to many people.
There is no doubt that military assets will be used in the future for domestic disaster relief.
The Asian Bird Flu has the potential to lead to a human influenza pandemic that could have This paper will examine what the potential effects of a human influenza pandemic might be on the United States and what the scope of the disaster response would entail. We will review current roles and planning that is underway, review national documents that have been recently published on a pandemic response, and potential military roles that must be addressed to make a coordinated federal response effective. Changes to current U.S. policy and law may be required. Recommendations for changes in disaster relief operations as well as planning and preparations that must be initiated now will be presented.
The Influenza Pandemic of 1918
A pandemic is an event that occurs over a wide geographic area and affects an exceptionally high proportion of the population. 1 Outbreaks of "the flu" are common and happen every year. "Seasonal outbreaks are caused by subtypes of influenza viruses that already circulate among people whereas pandemic outbreaks are caused by new subtypes that have not circulated among people…" 2 In the United States alone, 36,000 deaths are attributed to influenza annually. 3 When influenza turns into a global pandemic the impacts normally become much more serious with high levels of illness, death, and disruption to economic and societal systems. There have been a number of influenza pandemics during the 20 th century. 4 This strain of influenza was very contagious and infected over 28 percent of the U.S. population. This fact, combined with no anti-viral medications available during the time period, produced a mortality rate in the United
States of 2.5 percent, several times greater than the average mortality rate. 5 Unlike most influenza pandemics that effect very young and very old populations the most, this pandemic's highest death rate was in the 15-34 year old age group. The death rate for this group was 20 times higher in 1918 than in previous years due to the pandemic. Why this unusual age group was most affected is still unknown today. During the peak of the infections, more than 10,000
deaths occurred per week in many major American cities. The impact was so great it caused the life expectancy in the United States to drop by 12 years. 6 The U.S. population in 1918 was much less concentrated (more rural), less mobile, and on a war footing, and therefore much more inclined to listen to guidance from the state and federal government than could be expected in today's modern society. These and other factors will present significant challenges for the United States when the next influenza pandemic occurs.
The Avian Influenza "Bird Flu" H5N1
There is a wide variety of influenza viruses. Type A influenza viruses are categorized into sub-types based on changes to proteins on the surface of the virus itself. Hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes have 16 variations and Neuraminidase (NA) variations have six different strains.
These H and N subtypes combine in various forms to make many types of avian influenza. 7 Additionally, influenza A viruses can change over time by either a gradual mutation or what is called a reassortment of one or more of its gene segments between viruses. 8 The key point is that this ability of the virus to change could produce a virus that is very susceptible to human transmission.
The H5N1 influenza strain is extremely contagious and lethal in birds. Since the emergence of the strain in 1997 hundreds of millions of birds have died or been destroyed, to limit its spread in Asia and Eastern Europe. Although originally thought to be not transferable to humans, there have been a number of cases of humans contracting H5N1. These cases have been almost exclusively the result of handling or direct exposure to infected birds. So currently the ability of humans to catch the virus from birds is not high and the ability of humans to pass the virus to other humans is very low. The sobering fact is that in the 169 documented cases of human H5N1 to date, 91 deaths have occurred. 9 Asia has been hit hardest by the H5N1 virus with human deaths being reported in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
H5N1 deaths have also been confirmed in Turkey and Iraq. 10 Many other Asian countries have now reported H5N1 in bird populations. As well, countries throughout Europe such as Great Britain, Germany, Romania, Greece, Turkey and now Russia are reporting cases of H5N1 as the virus appears to be spreading by birds on migratory routes. 11 As the avian H5N1 becomes more widespread, contact with humans increases thereby increasing the potential for H5N1 to mutate into a form that is more easily passed between humans.
The World Health Organization (WHO) breaks down global pandemics into six phases:
• Inter-pandemic Period 12 We are currently in the phase three alert period for the H5N1 virus. Because H5N1 has not been identified in humans before the current outbreak, there is very little human immunity for this strain. Although the severity of the next influenza pandemic cannot be determined until it emerges, a mutated virus that is easily spread between humans coupled with a high mortality rate is cause for serious concern.
Primary Means to Combat Pandemic Influenza
Although there is no cure to prevent a pandemic, since the devastation of 1918, a number of methods to combat its effects have been developed. The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, published in November 2005, describes a number of response actions which include: surveillance measures, the use of antiviral drugs and vaccine, public heath measures, healthcare and emergency response, and public communications.
Surveillance of populations will aid in the early identification of human to human spread of the influenza. This will aid clinical evaluation of the pandemic strain of influenza and help local, state, and federal officials take necessary action to contain the spread of the pandemic.
A vaccine is defined as a living or dead virulent organism that is administered to produce or artificially increase immunity to a particular disease. 13 Vaccines will be a key component of pandemic response as a measure to prevent the spread of the virus. However, a vaccine for a novel pandemic flu strain cannot be mass produced until the virus presents itself and can be studied and broken down. Despite work by scientists at the National Institutes of Health, predictions say the process to develop a vaccine will likely take six to nine months. 14 Only then can an effective vaccine be mass produced -leaving populations unprotected during the early stages of the pandemic.
Antiviral drugs do not prevent infections but lessen the severity of influenza in the body and will be a key treatment during a pandemic particularly in the early stages until a vaccine is way. Generic production is increasing in several countries which will increase overall availability but all U.S. government planning assumptions indicate the demand for antiviral drugs will far exceed on hand quantities. U.S production of oseltamivir is being pursued by HHS to help improve our national posture. 15 The federal government also maintains the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of emergency medical supplies which includes antiviral drugs. Even after increasing stockage levels at the end of 2005, quantities in the SNS will treat less than two percent of the U.S. population. 16 The President and Congress are both serious about increasing our preparedness in this area and have approved funding of increases of antiviral drugs to the range of seven percent 17 coverage with more increases likely. In addition to the SNS, the Department of Defense (DOD) has begun to stockpile antiviral medications to cover military needs and ensure timely distribution to priority populations based on DOD national security priorities. 18 Public heath measures will be an important component of pandemic flu containment.
Measures including the use of personal protective equipment such as gloves, masks and hand hygiene, cleaning and disinfecting of common surfaces, and handling of pandemic flu patients must all be addressed. Actions such as canceling public events and activities that put people in close quarters such as school, church, or mass transit will all have to be evaluated for impacts on public health. Control measures such as isolation and quarantine may also be useful tools in slowing the spread of a pandemic and fall within the realm of public health measures. 19 Healthcare response is another area critical to pandemic response. The ability to surge healthcare services, particularly ICU beds and ventilation services for treatment of pneumonia, will be key. HHS is developing a mass causality capability that is deployable and targeted to augment organic hospital capacity. A pandemic could quickly become a catastrophic incident with mass fatalities. The ability to transport, process, store and make final disposition of deceased victims will likely overwhelm local capabilities. State and federal augmentation for mortuary services will likely be required. to more serious morbidity and mortality rates than seasonal influenza. HHS estimates an influenza pandemic similar in scope to 1918, without intervention measures applied against it could result in 1.9 million American deaths, 10 million hospitalizations, and hundreds of billions of dollars in health related costs throughout the course of the pandemic that could last over a year. 23 These numbers are driven by modern trends such as more population in urban areas, increased aging population, and global travel which could lead to significantly more people affected than in past pandemics. Global travel alone will dramatically change the way a pandemic will spread. Pandemic influenza is easily transmitted between people and can be transmitted by people that do not yet show symptoms making it possible for nearly simultaneous outbreaks to occur globally. 24 The pandemic could be spread globally in months or even weeks.
With these estimates, health care systems could easily become overloaded. Couple this with many health care providers, first responders, and emergency service providers as victims of the pandemic themselves and you have public systems that will begin to break down.
Possible Affects of Pandemic on the U.S. Military
The pandemic of 1918 caused 43,000 deaths in the U.S. military. In the U.S population approximately one in twenty persons between the ages of 18 to 50 (prime service age) died in a span of 10 weeks because of the pandemic. 25 While There are a number of organizations within DHS that will play a role in a pandemic response. In conjunction with DHS, HHS manages a large stock of medicines and medical supplies called the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). HHS was charged by Congress in 1999 to develop and maintain the SNS to protect the public in the event of a national health emergency of such significance that local supplies are depleted. 33 The SNS is configured into pushpackages that can be deployed to affected areas in 12 hours and follow up packages for Because the magnitude of the hurricane was so large and first responders at the local and state levels were overwhelmed, the federal response was even more critical. With the problems encountered between all levels of government and the various federal agencies involved, the Missions DOD will be required to execute in the event of pandemic are far reaching.
Previous DoD guidance on pandemic planning focused on Force Health Protection (FHP). Expanding the role of federal military forces will have second and third order effects that must be weighed carefully. The impact of stretching the force by committing more manpower to disaster support during a time of war, legal implications for the force, increased budget costs, and the impact on public perception of the military must all be considered.
Impact of the Posse Comitatus Act on Military Response to Pandemic Support
The ramifications of any new mission for the U.S. military in support of disaster relief within the borders of the United States requires close study based on the 1878 congressional act commonly referred to as "Posse Comitatus" 43 The Latin term posse comitatus translated means "the power of the county" 44 and in this context, relates to the power of a local county sheriff to form a posse of armed men to expand the size and capability of local law enforcement officials to assist with the enforcement of laws.
During civil war reconstruction, the U.S. Army stationed in the southern states was commonly used to enforce reconstruction policy and local laws. The act was initially passed as reconstruction ended, to prevent the common practice of the Army being used to conduct domestic law enforcement. The examples of exceptions to the principle of the act are numerous and varied in scope. 47 The Air Force and Navy have been used in the war on drugs, immigration control, and tariff enforcement to interdict smugglers beyond U.S. borders. Code details state control of National Guard forces. 48 The President also has the power to federalize National Guard forces placing them under the control of the federal government.
Once National Guard forces have been federalized they are subject to the same Posse Security is making improvements in its organizational structure as well as its ability to coordinate federal actions. However, recent reports on Hurricane Katrina response underscore that much work is still required for DHS to be effective at interagency coordination and direction. The report by the HSC also brings back the recommendation that DOD should be placed in charge of disaster relief under certain circumstances. 58 HHS, the lead for all health related issues during a pandemic, is taking an active role in preparing the nation. I believe the HHS understands that pandemic influenza is its "Hurricane Katrina" on a larger scale and is taking extensive action to be ready. operations during an incident of national significance but need to be further refined to make them more effective. A willingness by other departments and agencies to "buy-in" to this interagency process is also required.
DOD resources that can be used in a federal response to a pandemic are significant. The extent to which those assets are employed will be scrutinized at many levels. Increasing the SNS level to 40% now will offer the U.S. population more protection in the early stages of a pandemic, reduce scrambling to obtain more doses once the pandemic begins, and will help stimulate domestic production of these medications. 60 HHS is involved with some coordination at the federal level but should increase its interagency leadership on health issues of pandemic response. The HHS Pandemic Response Plan does not list "coordinate information sharing with other federal agencies" as a task until Phase 6 of a pandemic. 61 This needs to be a core task conducted during all phases of pandemic planning.
Most of the technical issues of pandemic planning, preparation and response are now being adequately addressed at the departmental level. Departments and agencies are actively involved with their own internal planning and state and local governments are being brought into medical preparations of the national response plan. However interagency coordination needs to be improved. Not enough information sharing is taking place across the federal government. As the HSC continues to develop the National Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza some improvement at the action officer level can be observed but more needs to be accomplished. If this process is not improved during the planning and preparation phase, the response phase of the pandemic will be fragmented and the American people will suffer in the end.
We as a government cannot figure out who is going to be in charge of a national pandemic response after it starts or worse yet, when it become a catastrophic event. Based on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, President Bush indicated he wants Congress to consider placing the Department of Defense in charge of disaster relief operations. 62 The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report published in February 2006
also recommends that in some cases DOD should be the lead in federal response to a catastrophic incident. These statements run counter to all recently published strategy and implementing policy on disaster relief and the role of DHS. DHS has clearly been identified as the lead federal agency for incidents of national significance and should be allowed to develop that capability. It does not make sense to develop a national response system and then change the leadership organization when a worst case situation is at hand. DHS is just three years old and has not matured as an agency to the point it can maximize the effectiveness of the many disparate functions it now controls. The larger organizational question is whether DHS should be responsible for such a wide variety of missions or should it shed functions such as disaster relief that are not specifically related to security of the homeland. Regardless of that debate, DOD should not be given the lead role for disaster relief, but use its significant resources, as directed by the President, to support relief efforts as appropriate. DOD must maintain focus on its prime mission of national defense. Clear command and control relationships must be decided at the executive level then enforced across all departments to coordinate the federal response. Much of this structure has already been laid out in the NRP and the NIMS and needs to be enforced at the executive level. Governors to respond to disaster relief missions in a Title 32 status. I recommend the status quo approach to force structure as it leaves adequate forces in place for all missions and avoids a large political battle that will divert focus from preparing for the nation's security threats.
HSC needs to drive the interagency process as directed in HSPD-5 and complete the implementation plan for pandemic influenza. Current departmental levels of activity will cover the major events of a pandemic. But an efficient and effective, coordinated response is still not realized. If the interagency process and clear command and control issues can be resolved before the next pandemic, the American people will be the beneficiaries.
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